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Widespread political support has expanded the use of market driven performance
reforms. A growing number of these reforms aim to increase democratic accountability
and enhance performance by including citizens in the evaluation phase of the
administrative process. However, citizen support for market themes is unclear. Do they
share elected officials enthusiasm or are there limitations on their support? This research
assesses these questions by examining the demographics of support for financial sanctions
and performance pay in education. The results reveal targeted demographic groups are
generally less supportive of organizational sanctions and employee incentives than
untargeted groups. Targeted parents, including racial minorities, urban, poorly
educated, and economically disadvantaged parents were the most opposed to market
reforms designed to enhance of the quality of educational services provided in their
communities.

T

he mounting support for New Public Management (NPM) principles among
policymakers has been duly noted (Ho and Ni, 2005; Berman and Wang, 2000; Willoughby,
2004). However, literature assessing citizens’ support or lack thereof has not been as
forthcoming. Do citizens share elected officials enthusiasm and optimism about NPM
principles? Or are there limitations on their support? If so, are there demographic and
socioeconomic trends that help explain variations in levels of support for NPM themes
among citizen groups? This research undertakes the task of assessing these issues by
examining the following research questions: 1) is there public support for the use of
performance incentives and sanctions that link teacher salary and school funding to student
performance and 2) does this support vary significantly among demographic groups?
The analysis will allow the study to add to the discussion of Light’s (2006) macro
and Kelly’s (2005) micro concerns about the usefulness of public sector performance
management reforms and their ability to adequately appease citizens. It will also allow for
an assessment of policymakers’ assumption that target groups such as parents, urban
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residents and the economically disadvantaged exhibit high levels of support for the use
performance incentives and sanctions in education. A lack of support among the
aforementioned groups could provide evidence that assist in efforts to understand why the
No Child Left Behind (NCLB) student transfers provisions, targeting citizens in
underperforming school, have been underutilized (Kahlenberg, 2010; Brown et al, 2005).
Additionally, the research will allow for a determination of whether citizens view the use of
incentives and sanctions along different continuums.
The perception of positive
performance incentives through teacher performance pay may elicit a different response
from negative school sanctions, especially among those with different levels of involvement
and sophistication (Chingos and Henderson, 2010; Schnieder et al, 1998).
The demographic variables understudy includes income, neighborhood type,
parental status, education, party identification, and political ideology. Several of these
variables have been included in previous studies (Howell et al, 2007; Chew, 1992; Cooper,
2005). This research expands on their efforts by not only conducting a comparative
analysis of the views of targeted citizen groups but also performing a more specialized
assessment of parents within each group. By examining the views of low income, urban,
and poorly educated parents we can begin to make more accurate determinations about how
best to appease and engage them.
The research begins with a brief review of performance reforms in public
education and the importance of citizens’ views and support. I then explain the method of
data collection for the study’s national population sample and continue with a discussion the
findings. I conclude with implications for the future of performance and market reforms in
education.
Underserved Populations and Performance Accountability
Efforts to promote performance management and include citizens in the administrative
process are often rooted in the economic principal agent theory. The theory posits that the
principal, who is often limited by time and expertise, hires an agent to perform a task on his
behalf. The agent is expected to take reasonable care of the principal’s business and
complete the task in the most efficient and effective manner.
Theoretically agents that fail to uphold their contractual obligations to the principal
are subjected to sanctions. In the private sector, the sanctions often include a loss of
business due to the customer’s ability to seek the services of similar providers. In the public
sector such remedies are often lacking, leaving employees with the ability to exploit the
principal agent relationship and citizens with inadequate remedy for poor service quality
(Mosher, 1982). Several scholars have raised concerns about this exploitation as it relates
to racially and economically vulnerable members of society. Stiver’s (2007) posited that
bureaucrats’ racism and classism influenced the poor quality of services economically
disadvantaged minority residents received after Hurricane Katrina. Shelby (2002) noted
that racial minorities often suffer due to racialized policy and administrative decision
making that impacts their life chances and opportunities. Maynard-Moody and Musheno
(2003) contribute that minorities suffer at the hands of public educators, counselors, and
other public employees who place citizens into 3 categories: those worthy of extraordinary
help, those who get what the rules say and no more, and those who get no help (Stiver,
2007).
Terry Moe adds to the plausibility that vulnerable citizens suffer at the discretion
of uninterested or disconnected public agents by providing an example of exploitation in the
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public school arena. He argues that the lack of accountability mechanisms in the public
school system has led to an increased attraction of the wrong type employees. These
employees are self-interested, unmotivated, job security conscious, and concerned only with
maintaining the status quo (Moe, 2003). It is believed that their prevalence has decreased
the quality of education and increased citizens’ demands for policies that are cognizant of
the needed reforms (Hurst et al, 2003; Rudalevige, 2003).
Recent federal policies have attempted to accommodate this belief by adopting a
paternalistic approach that significantly limited citizen input in policies fostering a shift
from policies that promote the use of autonomy and professional accountability as effective
tools to meet the needs of the citizens to policies that incorporate neoliberal reforms such as
performance accountability, incentives, and more open citizen inclusion in performance
evaluation (Little and Bartlett, 2010; Wong, 2008). The shift to accommodate the reforms
is best captured in the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB).
No Child Left Behind
NCLB sought to improve the quality of education through the use of market principles
(Tabb, 2002).
Central among these principles are the beliefs that performance
accountability, competition, and choices for citizens will not only lead to a higher quality of
services but also appease and empower concerned parents by offering them more control
(Hurst, 2007). The legislation began by requiring all 50 states to develop a performance
system outlining incremental increases in student performance that ultimately would result
in 100 percent of students demonstrating a proficient understanding of selected subject areas
by the end of the 2014 school term. Advancement toward performance goals were to be
measured and recorded through the public release of student test results. Teachers in
schools demonstrating competence, defined as the achievement of legislated performance
goals, would enjoy job security and public accolades. Those operating in schools that failed
to achieve performance goals would potentially encounter sanctions (Fusarelli, 2004;
McGuinn, 2006).
NCLB Performance Sanctions
The sanctions were outlined in a five year school improvement plan. The first year a school
failed to meet state performance targets, it was to be placed on a watch list and required to
develop an improvement plan. The second consecutive year a school failed to meet
performance goals, the district was required to provide any student attending that school the
option to attend another school that met performance expectations. The option to transfer
was accompanied by a provision which inflicted a financial sanction on the
underperforming school by requiring the district to pay the cost of transportation. The third
year of sanctions expanded on years one and two by also requiring the district to offer
supplemental educational services to any student qualifying for a free or reduced lunch.
The supplemental services imposed a second round of financial sanctions on poorly
performing schools by requiring the district to finance the cost of services that were to be
provided by an outside entity (Burch, 2007). Sanctions for years four and five allowed for
the dismissal of staff, a state takeover, the introduction of private sector control, or a
conversion to a charter school.
Concerns for Citizen Support for Sanctions & Market Reforms
The sanctions of years two and three cater to assumptions that citizens believe educators are
primarily responsible for educational outcome and should be sanctioned in a manner similar
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to those of unsatisfactory private sector businesses that are forced to better appease
customers or confront grave financial losses as clients seek the services of their competitors.
Widespread support for such assumptions could significantly alter the way Americans
engage in the educational process while simultaneously addressing desires for democratic
accountability (Mosher, 1982). However it is unclear if citizens agree with financial
sanctions that are linked to performance. Budgetary evidence suggests that many of the
citizens poised to benefit the most from publically induced finance sanctions have neglected
to exercise their right to do so. Less than 7 percent of the estimated $1.8 billion reserved for
transfers out of poorly performing school and supplemental services have been activated by
students and parents attending academically vulnerable Title I schools (Kahlenberg, 2010).
Similarly survey research has failed to demonstrate support for school funding
sanctions because researchers have largely chosen to forgo its examination and focus on
other elements of modern performance reforms such as the transfer provision, mandatory
testing, charter schools, and vouchers. These accountability provisions are important and
warrant examination. However, their successful use is linked to the assertion that citizens
support the use the financial sanctions for underperforming schools. If the assumption is
incorrect, citizens will not use mandatory test results in a manner that compels the school of
exit to finance the cost of student transfers or supplemental services. They will also be less
inclined to support performance provisions that extract funds from academically weak
public schools to support charter school and voucher programs. A lack of support for such
provisions would also raise concern for applications of coproduction theory to current
education reforms. Coproduction theory asserts that policymakers and citizens must act as
equal partners or co producers of education policy reforms (Marschall, 2004; Rosenstone
and Hansen, 1993). Education policies that fail to align with citizens ideas and preferences
demonstrate a lack of consider for citizens role as co-producers of policy outcomes.
Citizens may then respond to such policies with inactivity. When this occurs performance
provisions that aim to enhance educational outcomes by allowing citizens to sanction
underperforming schools are unlikely to receive public support and success.
Given the implications of funding sanction assumptions, this research examines
citizens’ view on sanctions for poorly performing schools as well as their views of
performance pay in education. Adding performance pay to the analysis allows for an
assessment of views on two essential components of market and performance models,
incentives and sanctions. Like funding sanctions, if citizens do not support performance
pay, its long term use is jeopardized. Examples of such occurrences are found in the State
of Oregon’s Department of Transportation where Broom (1995) noted that its employee
incentive program saved the state millions of dollars. However the program was
discontinued when citizens expressed resentment toward the use of financial incentives.
Assessing views on incentives will also allow for determinations regarding whether citizens
view rewards and sanctions differently. If there is substantial support for reward but
minimal support for sanctions, then future education performance policies may gain more
traction with citizens by emphasizing rewards, not sanctions.
Six hypotheses are created to assess varying levels of support for school funding
sanctions and teacher performance pay among different demographic groups. The
hypotheses propose that the individuals from whom support is most needed and desired are
the least likely to concur. Their position in society, via interaction with school
administrators and educators, commitment to their community institutions, and fears of the
inequalities associated with market tradeoffs render them more leery of market reforms than
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their more affluent and less involved counterparts. The six variables included are income,
education, political ideology, political party, parent status, and residency. Further analysis
is undertaken to determine whether uneducated and economically vulnerable parents are
more or less supportive of provisions targeting their children than their counterparts.
Hypotheses and Measurement
Hypothesis one proposes parents are less likely to support educational performance reform
policies than nonparents. Parents are among the primary targets of education reforms.
Federal legislation has sought to better inform and engage them by requiring states to
publically report performance results to parents after which parents are allowed to remove
their child from underperforming schools with the school of exit financing transfer cost.
The plausibility of successful provision enforcement is linked to parents’ support for the
belief that educators are responsible for performance outcomes and should be sanctioned for
dismal test results. Bushaw and Lopez’s (2010) documentation of Gallop Poll results
question this assertion by highlighting parent’s positive perceptions of their education
system. Approximately 71 percent of parents had confidence in the men and women
teaching their children. Sixty three percent of parents believed schools had a positive
impact on their oldest child and inspired them to learn, and 76 percent identified parents as
the key determinant in whether children would learn in school (Bushaw and Lopez, 2010).
Such perceptions among parents should decrease the likelihood that they will support school
sanctions and teacher performance pay that is linked to student outcomes. Parental status is
measured by asking respondents whether they had school aged children living with them.
Hypothesis two proposes low income individuals are less likely to support
educational performance reform policies than those with higher incomes. Low income
individuals are likely to attend underfunded and underperforming schools. Their awareness
of the challenges of impoverished schools should decrease support for policies that diminish
the funds of an already financially stressed school and complicate efforts to recruit quality
teachers. Low income individuals are also less likely to have accurate information about
performance policies and how they might positively impact the quality of their child’s
education (Schneider et al, 1998). The lack of information can lead to negative evaluations
of performance reforms. They are also less likely to have the knowledge, skills, and contact
to understand and navigate the choice system in education (Apple, 2004; Ball, Bowe, and
Gewirtz, 1994). The same arguments can be applied to hypothesis three which states
individuals with low levels of education are less likely to support performance reform
policies than those with higher levels of education. Income was measured by asking “Last
year what was your total family income before taxes: below $20,000, $20-40,000, $4060000, $60-80,000, $80-100,000, or $100,000 and above.” Education was measured by
asking “What was the highest grade of school you completed: less than 12 th grade, 12th
grade, some college, college graduate, graduate work.”
Hypothesis four posits Republicans are more likely to support performance reform
policies than Democrats. The Republican Party’s proactive support of market based
education reforms has been documented in the literature (Chubb and Moe, 1990; Savas,
1987). Some examples of those reforms include the use of performance measures, school
choice programs, vouchers, contracting out school services, and the proliferation and
expansion of private and charter schools (Patrick, 2007; Gittell and McKenna, 1999;
Himmelstein, 1990). Democrats have supported performance reforms (Gore, 1993;
Thompson, 2003) but they tend to gravitate toward voluntary efforts that do not require
voucher programs and other neoliberal efforts that reduce or remove funding from public
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schools (Patrick, 2007). Party identification is measured by asking respondents whether
they considered themselves to be Democrat, Republican, or some other party affiliate. This
analysis limits responses to Democrat and Republican identifiers.
Hypothesis five posits that liberal ideologues are less likely to support performance
reform policies than conservatives. Elliot and MacLennan (1994) noted that conservatives
argue that the use of market techniques such as options for parents who wish to choose
among schools of varying levels of performance and quality can serve as a remedy to
underperforming schools. Apple (2004) also noted that conservatives support for
educational reform elements such as competition, markets, choice, performance
accountability, and national testing have heavily influenced modern day education reforms.
Furthermore, he adds that conservatives view the traditional school system as one of market
failure, disappointment and loss (Apple, 2004). Beliefs systems such as these increase
conservatives’ support for financial sanctions (Schneider et al, 1997) while liberals tend to
remain unsupportive of school funding and pay for performance provisions that results in
decreased funding to underprivileged schools and threaten their ability to attract quality
educators. Political ideology was assessed by respondents self-identifying themselves as
liberal, moderate, or conservative.
Hypothesis six posits urban residents are less likely to support performance reform
policies than rural residents. Stephen (2007) noted that NCLB performance reforms were
designed to accommodate diverse urban populations. Unlike rural residents who live in
sparsely populated areas, urban residents have access to more education service providers.
However, their frustration with poorly funded inner city schools that cannot attract and
retain quality teachers should diminish their support for funding sanction (Ainsworth,
2002). Residency was measure by asking “Which of the following best describe the place
where you live: rural area, urban subdivision or suburb, or urban area not a suburb?”
Research Methods and Variables
Data used in this analysis were taken from a national public opinion survey conducted by
the Survey Research Laboratory of the Mississippi State University Social Science
Research Center during the fall of 2008. The survey was designed to provide a snapshot of
citizens’ views on education performance reforms as well as other social and economic
policy areas. The time point of data collection is of particular importance because of the
high visibility of the issue and citizens’ ability to actively utilize market techniques in
education. Prior to 2008 citizens in some states were unable to utilize the transfer provision
because state legislation did not provide for its implementation until the 2008 school term.
The 2008 school term also served as the midpoint of the federal NCLB timeline for states to
demonstrate that 100 percent of students were proficient in selected subject areas.
Additionally, the 2008 presidential election year placed education reforms at the forefront
of the national agenda. Both candidates highlighted the usefulness of performance and
market techniques, such as teacher performance pay, as means to enhance educational
outcomes. These combined elements heightened awareness of market reforms in education
and make 2008 an optimal time point to assess citizens’ views on the issue.
Approximately 1210 adult across the United States were interviewed through a
computer assisted telephone interviewing system (CATI). The CATI system is among the
oldest and most accepted forms of computer assisted interviewing. It allows the researcher
to collect large amounts of data in a short amount of time while simultaneously decreasing
selection bias by utilizing a stratified random digit dialing technique to select households to
- 179 -

http://digitalscholarship.tsu.edu/jpmsp/vol20/iss2/5

6

Patrick: Performance Management and Citizen Induced Financial Sanctions an
Patrick

Is There Public Support?

contact. Upon initial contact, trained interviewers then further randomize and diversify the
sample population by asking to speak with the adult who has had the most recent birthday.
Once this individual is identified and agrees to participate in the study, the computer will
prompt the interviewer to read a series of multiple choice questions from the computer
monitor and enter the appropriate responses. The multiple choice format allows the
interviewer to point and click on the right answer. The answer is then converted into a code
by the CATI system and uploaded into a database.
All calls were made between the hours of 5 pm and 9 pm during the week, from 10
am to 6 pm on Saturday, and 1 pm to 9 pm on Sunday. The overall response rate was
54.9% and the sample error was 3.5% thereby indicating that if every adult US resident was
interviewed the results could differ up to 3.5% from the reported results. In an effort to
address bias and present a representative sample, characteristics of the survey respondents
were compared to 2007 U.S. Census Bureau data. A weighting scheme was created and
applied to adjust the data by selected demographic characteristics including age, race,
gender, and education (Holmes and Goodman, 2010).
Dependent Variables
Citizen’s support for consequential performance policies, the dependent variable, was
measured by responses to two questions. The first variable, support for the organizational
sanction provision, was measured by asking respondents: “It is alright for a school that is
not meeting academic standards to lose money.” This statement allows for the assessment
of citizens’ views of school funding sanctions such as those identified by the NCLB citizen
induced sanctioning provision.
The provision seeks to remove funds from
underperforming schools by allowing students to transfer out of schools that consecutively
fail to meet performance goals and attend a higher performing school with the failing school
covering student transportation expenses. The second dependent variable, teacher
performance pay, was measured by asking respondents: “Public school teachers’ salaries
should be based on student performance.” This variable assesses support for Race to the
Top and other performance policy provisions that seek to link student performance to
teachers’ financial compensation. Respondents could strongly agree, agree, disagree,
strongly disagree, or neither agree or disagree with each statement. Those who strongly
agreed were code with the number one. Those who agreed were codes as two. Those who
neither agreed nor disagreed were coded with the number three. While those who disagreed
were coded as four and those who strongly disagreed was coded as five. Higher values of
the dependent variable indicate less support for the performance reforms under study. A
means analysis is performed to assess variations in citizens’ views. The means analysis
allows for a bivariate comparison of citizens’ views in each demographic group.
Additional analysis is performed by conducting a multivariate assessment of the
elements influencing school sanction and teacher performance pay attitudes. The
assessment allows the research to determine whether sanctions and pay incentives are
viewed along a different continuum. It also explores whether the impact of important
variables such as parental status, race, and economic class are mediated by other variables.
Findings
Table 1 includes the assessment of school sanction and teacher performance pay views. Its
higher school sanctions values for parents, urban, low income, liberal, and Democrat
respondents reveals support for the research hypotheses that these individuals are less
supportive of performance sanctions in education than their counterparts in the general
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population. Notable among the bivariate assessments is the wide margin of difference
between the mean level of school sanctioning support for liberals (3.43) and conservatives
(2.89) in the general population. Liberals were much less supportive of sanctioning schools
that fail to meet performance expectations. The finding aligns with those of previous
studies and is important to this analysis because ideological views are largely informed by
one’s life experiences, i.e. position in society. Social class, family practices and upbringing,
exposure to discriminatory treatment, quality of education received, access to education
advancement and economic opportunities, and a host of other variables influencing life
chances all culminate in one’s ideological perspective and often result in several vulnerable
groups that have experienced limited opportunities and discriminatory practices to adopt
liberal philosophies. These individuals, who are particularly targeted by policy reforms,
exhibited a lack of support of for policy assertions that sanctioning poorly performing
schools may invoke the desired change in outcomes. Their lack of support for school
funding sanction highlight the need to more meaningfully consider coproduction theory’s
call for increased venues and measures to allow a larger variety of targeted citizens to
function as active coproducers or partners in the creation of public policies. Without such
considerations, policies like the NCLB transfer provisions are likely to remain unsuccessful
because they do not capture the sentiment of targeted citizens. A point that is further
supported by the assessment of parents, minorities, and urban residents views.
Parents (3.28) were less supportive of performance funding sanctions for poorly
performing schools than nonparents (3.07, p<.01). Lower levels of support among parents
is consistent with the belief that parents’ knowledge of the school funding debate decreases
the likelihood that they will support efforts that link funding to performance (Bushaw and
Lopez, 2010; Buckley and Schneider, 2003). The finding also aligns with Brown’s (2005)
notation that parents in the states of Mississippi, Connecticut, Utah, Maryland, and Virginia
exercised caution in their request to utilize the transfer provision. Less than 3 percent of
transfer eligible student in these states requested and followed through with a transfer under
NCLB (Brown et al, 2005). Though lack of options may partially explain the dismal
transfer numbers in some districts it may not be the only variable accounting for the
underutilization of the transfer provision. Clearly parents’ lack of support for financial
sanctions may be a determining factor.
Urban residents were also significantly less supportive of school funding sanctions
than rural residents, average score of 2.62 to 2.30 (p<.01). Lower levels of support among
these individuals are explained by Payne (2008) who posits that unlike federal policymakers
who have a limited view of the issues in urban communities, urban residents’ experiences
with cultural, social, and economic issues that plague their schools provides them with a
multidimensional view of educational problems that financial sanctions and transfers are not
equip to address (Ainsworth, 2002). Utilizing these techniques might only serve to further
damage struggling urban schools (Stephen, 2007). Urban residents limited support further
demonstrate the need to more meaningfully engage citizens in policy development as
advocated by proponents of coproduction theory. The residential differences in opinion
might also be linked to ideological differences of rural and urban residents. School funding
sanctions, vouchers, and other financial reforms are often promoted and supported by
conservative ideologues. Rural residents have historically been more conservative while
urban residents have largely identified with liberal ideologues.
Democrats were also notably more opposed than Republicans. Lower levels of
support among Democrats support the study’s hypotheses and align with the last three
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decades of federal education legislation under Presidents George HW Bush, Bill Clinton,
and George W Bush. The Republican Presidential Administrations of both George H.W.
Bush and George W. Bush introduced legislation that promoted market reforms and
competition. The Clinton Administration pushed for the development of uniform
performance standards and evidence of outcomes (Hurst et al., 2003; Rudalevige, 2003;
Ziebarth, 2001).
Table 1. Demographic Variables and Support for Performance Policies
Support for
Support for
Ideology
Organization Sanctions Teacher Pay for Policies
Conservative
2.89
3.04
Moderate
3.21
3.18
Liberal
3.43
3.37
N Size
1145
1148
Significance
p=.000
p=.001
Party Identification
Republican
Independent
Democrat
N Size
Significance
Education
High School Dropout
High School Graduate
Some College
College Grade or Higher
N Size
Significance
Race
White
Minority
N Size
Significance
Income
Under $20,000
$20-40,000
$40-60,000
$60-80,000
$80,000+

Support for
Organization Sanctions
2.91
3.15
3.28
1160
p=.000

Support for
Teacher Pay for Policies
3.19
3.15
3.16
1162
p=.884

Support for
Organization Sanctions
3.07
3.15
3.15
3.18
1206
p=.874

Support for
Teacher Pay for Policies
2.95
3.00
3.39
3.35
1208
p=.000

Support for
Organization Sanctions
3.09
3.43
1206
p=.000

Support for Teacher Pay for
Policies
3.15
3.29
1208
p=.146

Support for
Organization Sanctions
3.22
3.26
3.05
3.30
3.11

Support for Teacher Pay for
Policies
2.66
3.29
3.22
3.29
3.27
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885
p=.286

887
p=.000

Support for
Organization Sanctions
3.07
3.28
1205
p=.004

Support for
Teacher Pay for Policies
3.08
3.33
1207
p=.001

Support for
Organization Sanctions
3.07
3.07
3.34
1189
p=.005

Support for
Teacher Pay for Policies
3.15
3.20
3.13
1193
p=.685

The bivariate assessment of teacher performance pay views offer support for the
parental and ideological hypotheses. Parents (3.33) were less supportive of linking
teachers’ salaries to student outcomes than nonparents (3.08). Liberals (3.37) were also less
supportive than conservatives (3.04). Similar to the discussion of funding sanctioning
attitudes, liberals’ ideological stance and modest support for the use of competitive
measures in education reform may be driven by their awareness of and sensitivity to the
negative drawbacks to vulnerable schools who seek to recruit top candidates. Policies
linking salaries to student performance in historically poorly performing school districts
may further diminish recruitment efforts. Likewise parents are more informed about the
challenges educators encounter. Their increases in knowledge leads to respect and
admiration for educator which in turn leads to opposition to policy reforms that carry
implications for teachers’ salaries based on student outcomes (Bushaw and Lopez, 2010).
Both education and income failed to yield findings in the hypothesized direction.
High school drop outs (2.95) were more supportive of teacher performance pay than college
graduates (3.35). Likewise, individuals with the least amount of income were more
supportive of teacher performance pay than those with higher annual incomes. The finding
indicates that although vulnerable citizens may be unwilling to financially sanction schools
they are supportive of holding educators accountable by linking their salary to student
outcomes. This aligns with Cooper’s (2005) assessment of the views of low income
African American mothers and guardians. She found these individuals held high levels of
distrust and frustration with their child’s public school teacher. Their frustration caused
them to value the use of performance mechanisms and to also seek the services of
alternative service providers in the private and charter and school arenas.
Cooper (2005) neglected to assess the views of parents of greater means and
education. This study’s assessment of these parents’ views reveals several important
findings. Parents with the least amount of education (3.98) were the most opposed to
teacher performance pay of all demographic groups. The contrast in findings between
parents with limited education and their counterparts in the general population (nonparent
mean value of 2.66) highlight the importance of a multivariate assessment of attitudes of
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two important variables, education and parental status. The failure to evaluate these
attitudes could misinform policymakers by giving them the impression the poorly educated
parents support performance pay models in education. College educated parents were
slightly more supportive of teacher performance pay when compared to parents who did not
complete high school. However it should be noted that they were more opposed than
college educated nonparents and high school dropout nonparents.
Table 2. Parental Controls
Ideology

Conservative
Liberal
Moderate
N size
Significance

Party
Identification

Republican
Democrat
Independent
N size
Significance

Education

High School
Dropout
High School
Graduate
Some College
College Grade or
Higher
N size
Significance

Race

Nonparent
Support for
Support for
Organization
Teacher Pay for
Sanctions
Performance
Policies
2.81
2.96
3.34
3.18
3.14
3.16
733
734
p=.000
p=.057

Parents Only
Support for
Support for
Organization
Teacher Pay
Sanctions
for Policies

Nonparent
Support for
Support for
Organization
Teacher Pay for
Sanctions
Performance
Policies
2.73
3.06
3.18
3.07
3.15
3.10
743
744
p=.000
p=.939

Parents Only
Support for
Support for
Organization
Teacher Pay
Sanctions
for Policies

Nonparent
Support for
Support for
Organization
Teacher Pay for
Sanctions
Performance
Policies
2.96
2.66

Parents Only
Support for
Support for
Organization
Teacher Pay
Sanctions
for Policies
3.48

3.98

3.11

2.93

3.21

3.13

3.08
3.08

3.36
3.33

3.29
3.34

3.43
3.39

779
p=.691

780
p=.000

411
p=.675

426
p=.004

Support for

Nonparent
Support for
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3.03
3.60
3.35
411
p=.001

3.18
3.47
3.16
416
p=.069

3.19
3.73
3.21
413
p=.000

3.40
3.33
3.25
416
p=.642

Parents Only
Support for
Support for
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Organization
Sanctions
White
Minority
N size
Significance

Income

Under $20,000
$20-40,000
$40-60,000
$60-80,000
$80,000+
N Size
Significance

Location

Rural
Suburb
Urban
N Size
Significance

3.06
3.14
779
p=.527

Fall 2014

Teacher Pay for
Performance
Policies
3.05
3.30
780
p=.040

Organization
Sanctions

Teacher Pay
for Policies

3.16
3.77
426
p=.000

3.34
3.26
427
p=.594

Nonparent
Support for
Support for
Organization
Teacher Pay for
Sanctions
Performance
Policies
3.10
2.51
3.16
3.27
2.99
3.17
3.30
3.41
3.03
3.29
537
538
p=.476
p=.000

Parents Only
Support for
Support for
Organization
Teacher Pay
Sanctions
for Policies

Nonparent
Support for
Support for
Organization
Teacher Pay for
Sanctions
Performance
Policies
2.99
3.02
3.07
3.20
3.19
3.02
772
774
p=.151
p=.111

Parents Only
Support for
Support for
Organization
Teacher Pay
Sanctions
for Policies

3.44
3.49
3.17
3.30
3.19
346
p=.472

3.21
3.09
3.65
416
p=.003

2.95
3.33
3.34
3.18
3.24
348
p=.404

3.35
3.21
3.39
416
p=.506

Table 2 highlights the views of parents and nonparents. The results yield
important findings that were not readily apparent in the initial analysis. For example, Table
1 indicates that high school dropouts were more supportive of school sanctions than college
graduates, thus failing to offer support for the research hypothesis. After isolating the views
of parents significant differences were reveal. The hypothesis was upheld. The mean value
for parents who did not complete high school was 3.48, a sizable decrease in support from
the means of 2.96 for high school dropout nonparents and 3.34 for college graduate parents.
Clearly those most likely to be unable to academically assist their children do not support
funding sanctions for poorly performing schools therefore efforts to meet their needs by
allowing them to financially sanction schools may be insufficient.
Sizable differences in the mean levels of support of urban and rural parents and
nonparents were also revealed. Initially rural residents (3.07) were notably more supportive
of school funding sanctions compared to urban residents (3.34), lower mean values indicate
more support. After controlling for parental status, rural residents were still more
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supportive than urban residents. However, the level of rural resident support decreased
from 3.07 (all) to 3.21 (parents). The level of support for urban residents decreased from
3.34 (all) to 3.65 (parents). Like the findings for those with the least amount of education,
the low levels of support among urban and rural parents raise doubt about efforts to
successfully reform schools by sanctioning poor performers.
A more holistic comparison of school sanction and teacher performance pay views
failed to yield consistent findings. Some groups were more supportive of school sanctions
while others were more supportive of teacher performance pay. For example, rural (3.21 to
3.35) and suburban parents (3.09 to 3.21) showed higher levels of support for school
sanctions than teacher performance pay. Urban parents were more favorable of teacher
performance pay policies than sanctions (3.39 to 3.65). Inconsistencies were found among
parents with the least and highest amounts of education. Both groups were more supportive
of school sanctions than teacher performance pay. Parents’ ideological philosophy
produced concurrent findings. Liberals and conservatives were both more supportive of
school funding sanctions than teacher performance pay. Lower levels of support could
produce problems for districts that require tax increases to finance performance pay
schemes. The variations in findings require additional multivariate analysis.
Conclusion
The support of elected officials, administrators, and citizens is pivotal to the
successful survival of market centered administrative reforms. While researchers have
made stride in assessing support among policymakers and administrator, documentation of
citizen support is somewhat scant. This research adds to the literature by assessing citizen
support for two neoliberal market themes found in education legislation, organization
sanctions and employee pay for performance. The findings reveal that support among
targeted demographic groups failed to show promise for reforms at the grassroots level.
Parents, low income, poorly educated, and urban respondents exhibited low levels of
support. A lack of support among these groups is detrimental to reform success. It may
help explain why less than 5 percent of eligible parents and students have requested a
transfer out of schools that fail to meet performance expectations (Brown, 2005).
The potential for additional information explaining the underutilization of
performance policies in education is further revealed in the dismal support found among the
parents of targeted student groups. These individuals demonstrated the lowest levels of
support of all demographic groups. Their lack of support indicates that current trends in
education performance reforms may be ineffective in their approaches to enhance
educational outcomes in a manner that engages vulnerable citizens and builds public trust.
More effective policies might be developed by actively considering how position in society
may impact the level of support targeted citizens harbor for neoliberal policy reforms. The
life experiences, access to information, and personal interactions of parents, urban residents,
the economically disadvantaged, and liberals can cause them to view market reforms
unfavorably. Policies that are cognizant of how their life experiences and chances color
their views are more likely to gain favor and success.
While this study’s finding contribute to our understanding of citizens’ views of
performance management legislation it is important to acknowledge its limitation. First, the
data was collected in 2008. Citizens’ perceptions of performance reforms may have
remained constant or shifted over time. Research incorporating more recent data is needed
to assess this issue. Second, although income and education may serve as a proxy for race
in this analysis, race is not included as a variable. Assessing views along racial lines will
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only strengthen our understanding of the issue. Lastly, it is important to note this study is
descriptive in nature. It primarily aimed to replace assumptions about citizens’ support or
opposition for financial sanctions and performance pay in education with evidence from a
national study. It was occupied with who and what, not why. The need for research
examining the “why” in citizens’ performance policy perceptions and preferences is duly
noted.
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